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Abstract
Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally re-
sponsible for an action despite not having any alternatives.  Some critics 
have responded by highlighting various alternatives that remain in the 
cases presented, while Frankfurtians have objected that such alterna-
tives are typically not capable of grounding responsibility.  In this essay 
I address the recent suggestion by Seth Shabo that only alternatives 
associated with the ‘up to us’ locution ground moral responsibility.  I 
distinguish a number of kinds of ability, suggest which kinds of abili-
ties ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution, and outline how these 
distinctions apply to the indeterministic buffer cases.
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1 Introduction
Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally 
responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some 
critics have responded by highlighting various alternatives that re-
main in the cases presented, and Frankfurtians have in their turn re-
sponded that such alternatives are not robust—not capable of ground-
ing responsibility. In this essay I distinguish two different kinds of 
‘up to us’ statement which, I argue, are made true by different kinds 
of ability. I articulate a number of different concepts of ability and 
ask which ones ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution when ap-
plied to actions, and in the process I address the recent suggestion 
by Seth Shabo that only alternatives associated with the ‘up to us’ 
locution ground moral responsibility. Using this framework I then 
assess what I take to be the strongest Frankfurt-style cases, the inde-
terministic buffer cases, showing how they fail.
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2 Shabo on alternatives and robustness
Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are scenarios where an agent, typically 
Jones, performs some action “on his own”, while being monitored by 
an external agent who is capable of manipulating the subject’s brain 
so as to cause him to decide in a particular way. The external agent 
does not, in fact, affect the agent, but is said to be able to detect 
whether intervention is needed, and thereby leave Jones unable to 
do anything different. FSCs are thus taken to be counter-examples 
to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which states that 
an agent can be morally responsible for an action only if the agent 
could have done otherwise. One response to the FSCs is to argue 
that, despite initial appearances, Jones does in fact have alternatives. 
Because some alternatives are clearly irrelevant to responsibility the 
challenge is to find alternatives that are capable of grounding respon-
sibility.  I will follow John Martin Fischer (1994: 142) in calling such 
alternatives robust. The following scenario, which for reasons that 
will become apparent I’ve called No Cup, illustrates this point:
(No Cup) Jones intentionally detonates an explosive device by 
keying in the activation code on his cell phone. He was being 
monitored by Black, who wanted him to detonate the device and 
would have intervened if need be (had Jones been going to decide 
to refrain from detonating the device, he would have twitched, 
and Black was going to use this fact to intervene). Unknown to 
Black and Jones, however, there was a 1% objective probability 
that the low rumbles of an overhead plane would cause the roof of 
Jones’s office to cave in. Had this happened Jones would have fled 
and made no decision concerning the explosive device.
Assume for the time being that this is a successful Frankfurt-style 
case: Black removes all the alternatives that might have been thought 
to be relevant to Jones’s responsibility for detonating the device. The 
current point is just that the small probability of Jones’s office col-
lapsing introduces a genuine alternative possibility, but one that is 
obviously irrelevant to any responsibility Jones might bear for deto-
nating the device. Thus, not all alternatives are relevant. This much 
is agreed upon by all parties.
What we need then is a robustness criterion which spells out 
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when alternative possibilities are relevant to responsibility. One sug-
gestion, which would explain the case above, is that robust alterna-
tives will be those associated with an agent’s abilities. Shabo (2014: 
384) articulates the distinction between these kinds of alternatives 
as follows:
(Mere alternative) Consistent with the past and the laws of na-
ture, it’s possible that the agent performs a different action (or re-
frains from acting), but the agent lacks the ability to realize this 
possibility; the past and the laws preclude this possibility from being 
realized except as a result of circumstances the agent doesn’t con-
trol, or with respect to which her control is markedly impoverished.
(Enabling alternative) Consistent with the past and the laws, 
it’s possible that the agent performs a different action (or refrains 
from acting), and, further, she has the power or ability or to real-
ize this possibility.
Shabo says that while it has long been recognised that mere al-
ternatives do not satisfy any interesting avoidability requirement, 
it is often thought that enabling alternatives do. Shabo argues 
that this latter point is not straightforward. He aims to illustrate why 
with the following example, which I will call Original Cup:
(Original Cup) Jones intentionally detonates an explosive device 
by keying in the activation code on his cell phone, while (inciden-
tally) resisting an urge to take a sip of coffee until he has com-
pleted the code. He was being monitored by Black, who wanted 
him to detonate the device, and who would have intervened if 
need be. Since Black has determined that whether or not Jones 
takes a sip of coffee during this interval reveals nothing about 
his intentions, his taking a sip would not have triggered Black’s 
intervention. Unknown to Black and Jones, however, the coffee 
contains a fast-acting neurotoxin that would have paralyzed Jones 
before he had a chance to complete the code (Shabo 2014: 386).
Here, just as with No Cup, there is an alternative possibility 
where Jones does not detonate the explosive: if he sips the coffee, 
he’ll be immediately paralysed. But in Original Cup, in contrast 
to No Cup, Jones is—in some sense—able to realise the alternative 
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where he bears no responsibility (by taking a sip of coffee). Shabo’s 
point is that this is not enough. He rightly points out that behind the 
demand for alternatives lies the demand for control. It is typically 
supposed that if an agent is able to do otherwise then that agent has 
the distinctive kind of control required, but Original Cup shows 
that not every sense in which an agent might realise an alternative 
bestows this control. Shabo suggests that what’s important is that the 
action be up to the agent. The connection between ‘up to us’ and re-
sponsibility goes all the way back to Aristotle and has been discussed 
at various points in the literature on Frankfurt-style cases (Frankfurt 
1969: 836, Naylor 1984, Alvarez 2009: 64).
How can it be up to Jones whether he sips the coffee but not up 
to him whether he detonates the device, given that sipping his coffee 
would have prevented him from detonating the device? According to 
Shabo, the crucial thing to recognise is that the ‘up to us’ locution 
introduces an intensional context (Shabo 2014: 379). Typically, an in-
tensional context is one where the substitution of co-referring terms 
does not preserve truth. To use Shabo’s example: Rob is the masked 
man, and Peter believes that the masked man robbed the poor box. 
But we cannot infer from this that Peter believes that Rob robbed the 
poor box because ‘believe’ introduces an intensional context (Shabo 
2014: 379). The intensional context introduced by the ‘up to us’ 
locution explains why it is possible that it is up to Jones whether he 
takes a sip of coffee, and that his taking a sip of coffee would lead to 
him not being blameworthy, and yet it not be the case that it was up 
to Jones whether or not he was blameworthy. A similar thing is true 
when Black’s intervention is involved, as the following case shows:
(Fresh Cup) Suppose that Jones’s coffee isn’t poisoned but that 
Black knows that Jones’s deciding to take a sip of coffee is a sure 
sign that he is having second thoughts about detonating the de-
vice. If Jones takes a sip of coffee, Black will intervene and force 
Jones to complete the activation code on time (Shabo 2014: 387).
As before, it’s up to Jones whether he takes a sip of coffee. But 
although Jones’s taking a sip of coffee will result in him being blame-
less, it is not up to him whether he is blameless. On the basis of 
these observations Shabo makes the following distinction between 
enabling alternatives (Shabo 2014: 385):
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(Non-robust enabling alternative) Consistent with the past 
and the laws, it’s possible that the agent performs a different ac-
tion (or refrains from acting), and, further, she has the power or 
ability to realize this possibility. Even so, the agent lacks a robust 
alternative possibility, one that could plausibly ground her moral 
responsibility for what she does, because it isn’t up to her whether 
this possibility is realized.
(Robust enabling alternative) As above, except the ability 
is such that, in virtue of possessing it, it is up to her whether 
this alternative possibility is realized. Such an agent has a robust 
alternative possibility, one that could plausibly ground her moral 
responsibility for what she does.
Shabo goes on to connect the ‘up to us’ locution to the epistemic 
component included in recent formulations of robustness criteria. 
Here is a recent robustness criterion from Derk Pereboom which 
includes an epistemic element:
For [an] agent to have a robust alternative to her immoral action A ... 
it must be that 
(a) she instead could have voluntarily acted or refrained from acting 
as a result of which she would be blameless, and
(b) that for at least one such acting or refraining, she is cognitively 
sensitive to its being available to her, with the result that she 
believes to some significant degree that had she voluntarily so 
acted or refrained she would be, or would likely be, blameless 
(Pereboom 2012: 301).
Shabo contends that the need for “the epistemic dimension added 
by clause (b) is a consequence of the fact that an alternative possibil-
ity is robust only if it’s up to the agent whether that possibility is 
realized; in short, this epistemic dimension is implicit in this kind 
of power attribution” (Shabo 2014: 395). Shabo appears to be say-
ing here that the epistemic criterion1 needs to be satisfied in order 
1 The relevant condition is frequently referred to as an epistemic condition even 
though it is widely accepted that it does not require knowledge. I will follow this 
terminology.
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for the power attribution most relevant to free will to be attributable. 
That is, the kind of condition identified by Pereboom in the above 
robustness criterion belongs to the power or ability that is relevant to 
free will; it does not belong, for example, to a separate “epistemic 
condition on moral responsibility.” As we might put it: knowledge is 
power—or, control.
This is a departure from the view which separates the freedom 
or control condition on moral responsibility from the epistemic con-
dition on moral responsibility—a view which, if not the orthodox 
position, is certainly one significant strand in contemporary writing. 
Such a view is widely endorsed by those on both sides of the debate 
over the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (See 
Fischer and Ravizza 1998, Ginet 2000, Timpe 2011). The following 
kind of example from Carl Ginet motivates the separation of epis-
temic and freedom conditions:
(Simon) Simon enters the hotel room he has just checked into 
and flips what appears to be, and what he takes to be, an ordinary 
light switch, but, to his surprise and consternation, the flipping 
of the switch sets off a loud fire alarm (Ginet 2000: 269).
On this view, Simon doesn’t bear any moral responsibility for 
setting off the fire alarm because he didn’t know he was setting off 
the fire alarm. Simon is in control of flipping the switch, and be-
cause flipping the switch results in the fire alarm going off, Simon 
is also in control of setting the off the fire alarm. If, however, the 
relevant power attribution includes an epistemic component in vir-
tue of which it introduces an intensional context then this conclu-
sion does not follow. Alfred Mele (2010) has recently presented a 
number of arguments for thinking that what is typically treated as a 
separate epistemic condition on moral responsibility may in fact be 
an epistemic aspect of what is required in order to have the control 
associated with free will. And prior to both Shabo and Mele, Alvin 
Goldman (1970, 1972) and Peter Morriss (1987) made similar dis-
tinctions which they took to be helpful when discussing control. It is 
this approach—treating these epistemic requirements as relevant to 
the agent’s control—that I will pursue in the following section via a 
discussion of the ‘up to us’ locution. Although this locution is often 
used in discussions of free will it is not often discussed in depth. 
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In the following section I seek to answer two questions: first, what 
kind of abilities ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution? Second, 
are the abilities associated with the ‘up to us’ locution necessary for 
moral responsibility?
3 Up-to-us-ness and abilities
3.1 The ‘up to us’ locution
Shabo suggests that the power attributions relevant to free will are 
those which ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution. Here we 
must be careful, however, because just as there are many different 
kinds of ability, so the ‘up to us’ locution can be used in different 
ways. In particular, it can take different kinds of complement. Some-
times it is used with actions:
(1) It’s up to me whether or not I turn on the light.
(2) It’s up to me whether or not I invite you to the party.
Other uses show that the complement may be filled in with a non-
actional state of affairs:
(3) It’s up to me whether or not the stone is on the grass.
(4) It’s up to me whether or not the stream is blocked.
Both are acceptable but it is crucial to distinguish between them be-
cause the contention of those who defend the PAP concerns primar-
ily the agent’s control over his or her actions. It is not a point about the 
control an agent has over arbitrary, non-actional states of affairs, as 
might be thought if statements such as (1) and (2) were confused 
with those like (3) and (4). The main reason for this is an asymmetry 
that exists between actions and (non-actional) states of affairs. Take 
a proposition P which asserts the occurrence of some dated state of 
affairs. Once the relevant time comes it must be the case that either 
P is true or ~P is true. And this means that when the ‘up to us’ locu-
tion takes a non-actional state of affairs as its complement it requires 
the agent to have the power to render P true and also the power to 
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render ~P true. For (3) to be true, for example, I need to be able to 
bring it about that the stone is on the grass and able to bring it about 
that the stone is not on the grass. With (4), I need to be able to block 
the stream and be able to unblock the stream. When the ‘up to us’ 
locution has a non-actional complement, then, it requires that the 
agent have the ability to bring about and the ability to prevent an 
event of the very same type.
This is not the case when the ‘up to us’ locution has an action as 
its complement. The natural way of reading (1), for example, is that 
I’m able to turn on the light and also able to refrain from turning on 
the light. In other words, the negative side of the locution—what 
the ‘not’ in the ‘whether or not’ attaches to—requires that the agent 
be able to refrain from something. But to refrain from something 
is not equivalent to the negation of the state of affairs of the agent’s 
performing the action. Let P be the proposition that I turn on the light. 
The negation of that proposition is it is not the case that I turn on the 
light. But it’s not being the case that I turn on the light does not entail 
that I refrained from turning on the light. If I drop dead before even 
thinking about the light then the statement ‘it is not the case that I 
turned on the light’ is true but I didn’t refrain from turning on the 
light. Ezio Di Nucci (2011: 119, 124) has discussed how this distinc-
tion is important for zeroing in on what PAP is about; part of my 
purpose here is to place this distinction in the larger context of the 
workings of the ‘up to us’ locution.
To summarise: in statements (1) and (2) the ‘not’ in ‘whether or 
not’ does not generate the negation of the locution’s complement, 
but a proposition describing a refraining. In (3) and (4), however, 
the ‘not’ produces the negation of the proposition which is the com-
plement to ‘up to us’. To put it somewhat differently: a proposition 
affirming the occurrence of a non-actional, dated state of affairs 
and the negation of that proposition are contradictories; a proposi-
tion affirming the performance of an action and its “negation” are 
contraries.
This asymmetry is hugely important. The dual-power or abil-
ity that the defender of PAP—the leeway incompatibilist—thinks 
is important is not, as might be suggested by (3) and (4), the power 
to bring about non-actional state of affairs P and the power to bring 
about non-actional state of affairs ~P. Now, it’s common enough for 
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agents to have such powers. I might have the power to bring about the 
stone’s being on the grass and the power to bring about the stone’s 
not being on the grass. But this kind of power, common as it might 
be, is stronger than what the leeway incompatibilist requires. The 
leeway incompatibilist’s demand for avoidability only need concern 
actions. It is the conflation of these two sets of abilities, I suggest, 
that leads people to find Frankfurt-style cases in any way plausible, 
and in section 4 I’ll show how being aware of it helps us to see where 
the buffer cases go wrong. In the remainder of this section I will only 
be concerned with the ‘up to us’ locution as it appears in (1) and (2).
There is a further complication that needs addressing before we 
can continue.  Shabo claims that the abilities which ground the truth 
of the ‘up to us’ locution include an epistemic component and that as 
a result the locution introduces an intensional context. I agree with the 
former point, but the latter point is not straightforward. As we’ve 
seen, intensional contexts are standardly defined as those contexts 
where the substitution of co-referring terms does not preserve truth. 
But with respect to the ‘up to us’ locution, what is it that the co-
referring terms refer to? The obvious answer is: actions. But here 
we encounter a difficulty, for whether different descriptions of what 
someone does ever co-refer depends on how one individuates actions. 
For example, on Goldman’s (1970) view actions are exemplifications 
of properties at times. Moreover, Goldman adopts a fine-grained 
view of property individuation and his comments make it clear that 
he would consider taking a sip of coffee to be a different property to 
rendering oneself morally blameless. Therefore, these descriptions of 
what Jones does will never co-refer.
I will bypass this complication by adopting a coarse-grained theo-
ry of action individuation such as that found in Anscombe 1963. Such 
a view of action will make the idea easier to apply: ‘Jones’s taking a 
sip of coffee’ may indeed refer to what ‘Jones’s rendering himself 
morally blameless’ refers to, so we can accept Shabo’s characterisa-
tion of things in terms of intensional contexts.
3.2 Abilities: non-intentional vs. doxastic, weak vs. reliable
In order to answer the question of which kind of abilities ground the 
truth of the ‘up to us’ locution I will outline a few different notions of 
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ability. Each kind of ability outlined below should be understood as an 
intrinsic ability that is maximally specific, that is, fully specified with re-
spect to the circumstances referenced. I also assume here that to have 
free will the agent will need an opportunity to exercise the relevant 
ability. I have argued for both these claims at length in Kittle 2015.
The first kind of ability to consider is, plausibly, that behind non-
robust enabling alternatives; I shall label it non-intentional ability:
(Non-intentional ability) An agent S is non-intentionally able 
to A in circumstances X if and only if 
(i) S is able to intentionally B in circumstances X, and 
(ii) S’s intentionally B-ing in X would be his A-ing.
A few words of explanation are in order. First, this is evidently 
not a reductive analysis: clause (i) of the explanans requires the agent 
to be able to intentionally B. Moreover, because clause (i) requires 
that the agent be able to intentionally B, the account is parasitic on an 
account of what it is to be able to do something intentionally. Sec-
ond, non-intentional ability defines an ability property in terms 
of an action and a set of circumstances, X, even though it is a kind 
of intrinsic ability. In other words, it is the ability-to-A-in-X that is 
possessed rather than merely the ability-to-A. Again, I have argued 
for this in Kittle 2015.
Non-intentional ability is a very broad notion of ability. If the 
agent can intentionally B, then the agent will have the non-intention-
al ability to do anything that would result from his B-ing. Here’s an 
example: suppose that Phillip flips a light switch and as a result the 
tungsten filament heats up to its standard operating temperature of 
around 2500 degrees C. Phillip doesn’t know this—he has no idea 
the filament is made of tungsten. Still, Phillip is non-intentionally 
able to raise the temperature of the filament to 2500 degrees C. 
Similarly for all the causal consequences which would follow reliably 
from his flipping the switch—the reliability condition is built into 
clause (ii). Jones, in the Fresh Cup example, has the non-intention-
al ability to prevent himself from being blameworthy. This explains 
the sense in which we can affirm that Jones is able to prevent himself 
from being blameworthy. But it also explains why that isn’t much 
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help, and doesn’t render the alternative robust: non-intentional abili-
ties bestow little, if any, control.
Now consider the following kind of ability:
(Doxastic ability) An agent S is doxastically able to A in X if 
and only if
(i) S is able to intentionally B in circumstances X, and 
(ii) S’s intentionally B-ing in X would be his A-ing, and
(iii) S is “cognitively sensitive” to the fact that that by B-ing he 
would be A-ing.
By using the phrase ‘cognitively sensitive’ I intend to draw on 
Pereboom’s recent work on the robustness criteria (Pereboom 2009, 
2012). I therefore use the phrase as a placeholder for the precise con-
ditions which the agent needs to satisfy in order to be ‘cognitively 
sensitive’. Moreover, it is expected that those conditions will be just 
those conditions which are usually discussed under the banner of 
“the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility” (See Ginet 2000: 
270ff and Timpe 2011: 18). It is not my purpose here to give an ac-
count of such a set of conditions but rather to provide additional sup-
port for Mele’s suggestion that such conditions might be best thought 
of as part of the control condition and then, given that background, 
to discuss the ‘up to us’ locution and the latest Frankfurt-style cases. 
Why think that the ‘cognitive sensitivity’ condition belongs to the 
control condition? Consider the following example:
(Trapped Tom) Tom is in a building which is currently ablaze. 
He has only one route of escape not blocked by the flames, but the 
route is blocked by a locked door protected by an electronic key-
pad. The combination is ‘453322’ but Tom does not know this.
Tom has the non-intentional ability to escape. That’s because he is 
able to intentionally type ‘453322’ into the keypad, and if he did so, 
the door would open and he could get to safety. Is Tom in control of 
whether he escapes? According to some of those who endorse a strict 
separation of the control and epistemic conditions on responsibil-
ity he is. But this is implausible. Suppose that Tom’s brother Tim is 
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trapped in a different corridor also protected by a locked door with a 
keypad. Tim is unfortunate, but not as unfortunate as Tom, because 
Tim knows the combination to the door which blocks his way. Intui-
tively, Tim has more control than Tom: it is up to Tim whether he 
escapes but it is not up to Tom whether he escapes. The account of 
doxastic ability can explain this: Tim has but Tom lacks the doxastic 
ability to escape.
The two notions of ability so far articulated require that there 
be a reliable connection between the agent’s B-ing and the agent’s 
A-ing (indicated by the ‘would’ in clause (ii)). Sometimes, however, 
it is only the case that an agent’s B-ing might be his A-ing. If the agent 
knows this, would that be enough for control? In the following sec-
tion I will suggest that sometimes the answer is yes. I will therefore 
define two further notions of ability which parallel the two outlined 
above but which replace the occurrence of ‘would’ in each of the 
clauses (ii) and (iii) with a ‘might.’ I will call these weak abilities:2 
weak non-intentional ability (though we will have little use for 
this) and weak doxastic ability. I will not write both definitions 
out but for illustrative purposes the definition for weak doxastic abil-
ity is as follows:
(Weak doxastic ability) An agent S is doxastically able to A in 
X if and only if
(i) S is able to intentionally B in X, and 
(ii) S’s intentionally B-ing in X might be his A-ing, and
(iii) S is “cognitively sensitive” to the fact that that by B-ing he 
might be A-ing.
With that framework in place, I will now seek to answer the 
questions posed at the close of section 2: first, what kind of abil-
ities ground the truth of the ‘up to us’ locution? Second, are the 
abilities associated with the ‘up to us’ locution necessary for moral 
responsibility?
2 Of course, the singling out of ‘reliable’ and ‘weak’ abilities in this way is a 
simplification; the reliability of abilities is best thought of as a spectrum.
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3.3 Abilities and up to us
Pereboom and Shabo each require that an agent be able to bring about 
the alternative reliably; witness Pereboom’s use of “would or would 
likely be” in his robustness criterion. This suggests that what Pere-
boom and Shabo want to endorse is the idea that the ‘up to us’ locu-
tion should be understood as involving reliable doxastic abilities:
(Up to us) It is up to the agent whether or not she A-s in circum-
stances X if and only if:
(i) The agent has the reliable doxastic ability to A in X, and
(ii) The agent has the reliable doxastic ability to refrain from A-
ing in X.
In fact, however, neither is committed to this. This is because 
in the literature on Frankfurt-style cases the robustness criterion 
is typically formulated only with reference to the “alternative se-
quence”. That is, it is assumed that the agent has performed an action 
and then it is asked what it takes for the alternative to be robust. On 
this retrospective approach nothing is said about the kind of abil-
ity that the agent actually exercised in producing her behaviour; the 
focus is entirely on the kind of ability the agent needed to have to 
realise the alternative possibility. So while Pereboom and Shabo are 
committed to something like clause (ii) they are not committed to 
anything like clause (i).
This is fortunate because I want to suggest that when it comes to 
the control associated with free will (i) is too strong. If this is right, 
then either Up to us is an incorrect characterisation of the ‘up to 
us’ locution or an agent can freely A without A being up to the agent. 
Here is an example, adapted from Robert Kane (1996: 55), which 
motivates the idea that (i) is too strong:
A plant worker places some radioactive material in his boss’s of-
fice with the intention of killing him. Over a period of time, 
before being discovered, the radioactive material emits enough 
radiation into the worker’s boss in order to produce a fatal cancer. 
It was genuinely indeterminate whether the material would emit 
enough radiation to give the worker’s boss cancer.
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Among the plant worker’s abilities are the following:
The reliable doxastic ability to place the material in his boss’s office
The reliable doxastic ability to refrain from placing the material in 
his boss’s office
Of course, the plant worker is responsible not just for putting some 
radioactive material in his boss’s office but also for killing his boss: 
that is what he intended to do, and that is what he did. What kind of 
ability did the plant worker have to do this? I think the answer is the 
following:
The weak doxastic ability to kill his boss
This is because the worker can do something which might—but only 
might—result in his boss’s death. If this is right, then the worker has 
the ability to kill his boss and the ability to refrain from killing his 
boss but these are different kind of abilities: his doxastic ability to kill 
his boss is weak while his doxastic ability to refrain from killing his boss is 
reliable.
Is it up to the worker whether he kills his boss? No. It would 
be strange to say that it was up to the worker whether he killed his 
boss and that is because the ‘up to us’ locution does indeed require 
a certain level of reliability. More precisely, it suggests that clause 
(i) of Up to us is on the right lines. This might be challenged in the 
following way. Though it’s somewhat intuitive that it’s not up to the 
plant worker whether he kills his boss, nevertheless it clearly is up to 
the plant worker whether he refrains from killing his boss. He can 
ensure that he refrains from doing so. And it might be thought that 
this is because the following statements are true:
The worker has the reliable doxastic ability to refrain from killing 
his boss
The worker has the weak doxastic ability to kill his boss
This, it might be thought, speaks in favour of requiring a reliability 
condition on only clause (i) of the account of ‘up to us’. But this is 
too quick and would be to make a mistake similar to that made by 
those who conflate dual-power over non-actional, dated states of af-
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fairs with dual-power over actions. If the complement to ‘up to us’ 
is he refrains from killing his boss, then the second ability which Up to 
us requires the worker to have will be the reliable doxastic ability to 
refrain from refraining to kill his boss. And this, I think, is an ability the 
worker does have because he has the reliable ability to try to kill his 
boss. This is an interesting point about the ‘up to us’ locution: the 
phrase ‘it’s up to me whether or not I A’ requires that I be able to reli-
ably refrain from A-ing, but to refrain from refraining to A does not 
require being able to reliably A, so the truth of the phrases ‘it’s up to 
me whether I A’ and ‘it’s up to me whether I refrain from A-ing’ are 
not grounded by the same abilities—they both require the ability to 
reliably refrain from A-ing, but the second ability in each case differs.
Now, if it’s not up to the plant worker whether he kills his boss, 
yet he is morally responsible for it, then the control which grounds 
that responsibility does not require the control required by the ‘up to 
us’ locution.  I offer the following as a tentative proposal for the kind 
of control which is capable of grounding responsibility:
(Freely able) An agent is able to A freely in circumstances X if 
(i) The agent has the weak doxastic ability to A in X, and 
(ii) The agent has the reliable doxastic ability to refrain from A-
ing in X.
On this account, when an agent is freely able to A it will not (nec-
essarily) be up to the agent whether he A-s, but it will be up to the 
agent whether he refrains from A-ing. Clause (i) is subject to an ‘if’ 
but not an ‘only if’ because possessing a stronger ability to A would 
also secure the required control. (Recall too that my discussion has 
been limited to intrinsic abilities; the agent also needs the opportu-
nity to A in X.) If correct, this account would (a) explain the close 
association between alternative possibilities and ‘up to us’, (b) retain 
the reliability criterion on ‘up to us’, and (c) explain the agent’s re-
sponsibility in cases like that of the plant worker. In the final section 
I will show how to apply this account to Frankfurt-style cases.
Simon Kittle50
4 The mixed response to indeterministic Frankfurt-style cases
4.1 The leeway incompatibilist’s task
If we accept some kind of doxastic condition on control then finding 
a robust alternative is not just a matter of finding an enabling alter-
native, we need to find the right kind of enabling alternative. Shabo 
thinks that this makes it harder for the leeway incompatibilist to re-
spond to Frankfurt-style cases. In particular, Shabo argues that once 
we recognise this doxastic condition it will be all the more evident 
that cases like Fresh Cup are counterexamples to the Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities.
I will show why Shabo’s contention is mistaken, but it is impor-
tant to focus on the right Frankfurt-style cases. The leeway incom-
patibilist in fact needs to say very little about Fresh Cup because 
it is an illegitimate case: it employs a prior sign which Shabo takes 
to be a reliable indicator of Jones’s decision and behaviour. But the 
leeway incompatibilist will reject the idea that there could be such 
a reliable indicator of a free decision. This is because Fresh Cup 
falls prey to what is known as the Dilemma Defence and which runs 
as follows: either the prior sign that indicates what Jones will do is 
deterministically connected to his decision or not. If it is, then the 
leeway incompatibilist will be under no obligation to agree that Jones 
is responsible; if it isn’t, then Black cannot expunge all of Jones’s 
alternatives.3 The No Cup and Original Cup cases also succumb 
to the Dilemma.
The only cases the leeway incompatibilist needs to address are 
those cases designed to avoid this dilemma. I think the so-called 
buffer cases are the strongest cases in this category and will address 
them below. In pursuing this strategy I am suggesting that the Di-
lemma Defence and the so-called Flicker Defence—the pointing to 
“flickers” which are capable of grounding the agent’s responsibility 
(Fischer 1994)—should be deployed together. This strategy is not 
ad hoc because the Dilemma Defence simply forces the Frankfurtian 
to provide a case which does not prejudge the very question at issue.
3 David Widerker’s (1995) is a useful formulation of the Dilemma Defence.
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4.2 The indeterministic buffer cases: a mixed response
The buffer cases have the following structure. Rather than employ 
a prior sign which operates as a reliable indicator of what the victim 
in the Frankfurt-style case will do, they employ a prior sign which is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the agent acting in some 
way. Thus, the agent cannot perform the alternative action unless 
the prior sign occurs, but after the prior sign occurs the agent still 
needs to make a decision to perform that alternative action. Pere-
boom, one of the first to present a buffer case, has offered the fol-
lowing example:
(Tax Evasion (2)) Joe is considering claiming a tax deduction for 
the registration fee that he paid when he bought a house. He knows 
that claiming this deduction is illegal, but that he probably won’t 
be caught, and that if he were, he could convincingly plead igno-
rance. Suppose he has a strong but not always overriding desire to 
advance his self-interest regardless of its cost to others and even if 
it involves illegal activity. In addition, the only way that in this sit-
uation he could fail to choose to evade taxes is for moral reasons, 
of which he is aware. He could not, for example, choose to evade 
taxes for no reason or simply on a whim. Moreover, it is causally 
necessary for his failing to choose to evade taxes in this situation 
that he attain a certain level of attentiveness to moral reasons. 
Joe can secure this level of attentiveness voluntarily. However, 
his attaining this level of attentiveness is not causally sufficient for 
his failing to choose to evade taxes. If he were to attain this level 
of attentiveness, he could, exercising his libertarian free will, ei-
ther choose to evade taxes or refrain from so choosing (without 
the intervener’s device in place). However, to ensure that he will 
choose to evade taxes, a neuroscientist has, unbeknownst to Joe, 
implanted a device in his brain, which, were it to sense the requi-
site level of attentiveness, would electronically stimulate the right 
neural centers so as to inevitably result in his making this choice. 
As it happens, Joe does not attain this level of attentiveness to his 
moral reasons, and he chooses to evade taxes on his own, while 
the device remains idle (Pereboom 2012: 302–3).
In this example Joe has to decide whether to claim an illegal tax 
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deduction. The necessary but not sufficient condition for his refrain-
ing is that he considers the moral reasons against evading taxes. But 
Joe might consider the moral reasons and—if there were no Frank-
furtian intervener—still go on to evade taxes. It is this feature that 
supposedly circumvents the force of the Dilemma Defence because 
there is no way it can be argued that the prior sign deterministically 
causes Joe’s decision to evade taxes. However, given the availability 
of this prior sign it seems that the neuroscientist is able to arrange 
things such that Joe has no robust alternatives. The alternative which 
does remain—Joe’s reaching the required level of attentiveness to 
moral reasons, and subsequently having his brain electrically stimu-
lated by the neuroscientist’s device to choose to evade taxes—is, 
Pereboom argues, not robust. This is because although the alterna-
tive is one where Joe doesn’t bear any moral responsibility, Joe him-
self does not realise this.
At this point, leeway incompatibilists might wonder whether 
they could accept the two intuitions that we are supposed to have 
with respect to Joe and explain Joe’s moral responsibility in terms 
of derivative responsibility. When an agent is derivatively responsible, 
the agent is responsible for some unavoidable action because there 
was some prior time at which the agent could have acted so as to 
not subsequently face an unavoidable action. The paradigm examples 
are drunk driver cases: Derek drives drunk and hits someone at t2; 
he could not have done any different at t2 because his drunken state 
drastically reduced the control he had; still, he could, at t1, have de-
cided not to drink, or given his keys to a friend, and so on.
David Widerker has applied this idea to Joe’s case, suggesting that 
Joe is “derivatively blameworthy for the decision he made, because 
he has not done his reasonable best ... to avoid making it” (Widerker 
2006: 173). Granted, Joe couldn’t have decided to not evade taxes. 
But Joe could have considered moral reasons and this was something 
he should have done. Moreover, if Joe had been more attentive to moral 
reasons, he would have been “forced by the neuroscientist to [decide 
to evade taxes]” and so would not himself be responsible for his deci-
sion (Widerker 2006: 173). So Joe’s failure to consider moral rea-
son makes him derivatively responsible for his subsequent decision 
to evade taxes.
The Frankfurtian can easily avoid Widerker’s objection, however, 
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by amending the example to remove the feature on which it relies, 
namely, that the available option is something the agent should do. 
Pereboom (2012: 307) has subsequently pursued this line of thought, 
proposing instead that in order to be able to make the free choice to 
decide not to evade taxes Joe has to, say, imagine being severely pun-
ished. Given that imagining being severely punished is not something 
agents have a moral obligation to do when deliberating, Widerker’s 
derivative responsibility objection cannot get started.
Although useful this amendment is, as Pereboom (2012: 307) 
says, not needed. Widerker’s appeal to derivative responsibility gains 
illicit plausibility from the fact that we would ordinarily assume that 
Joe would think that his considering moral reasons might lead him 
to decide not to evade taxes. That is, we ordinarily think that one 
way of deciding not to do something is by attending to the moral 
reasons there against doing it. Attending to the moral reasons against 
evading taxes is, in other words, plausibly thought to be a means to 
the end of deciding not to evade taxes. But Pereboom is clear that 
Joe does not know that considering moral reasons is a means to the 
end in question. Pereboom’s amendment is useful because by making 
the prior mental action something that is a little unusual, we are not 
tempted to think that Joe will see it is a means to the end.
Pereboom is correct in his evaluation of Widerker’s derivate 
responsibility objection; however, this does not show that appeals 
to derivative responsibility are out of place. It simply shows that 
Widerker was off target in his choice of what to trace back to in or-
der to ground Joe’s responsibility. Widerker’s attempt to trace back 
to Joe’s failure to consider moral reasons is a bit like attempting to 
explain a drunk driver’s responsibility for running someone down 
by tracing back to his decision to get into his car. By the time the 
driver “decides” to get into his car, it’s already too late: he’s already 
lost control. To explain the driver’s responsibility, we need to trace 
back to a time when the driver had the requisite control, i.e., to a 
time when he wasn’t drunk.
One thing to recognise at this point is that we need to appeal to 
derivative responsibility only if Joe doesn’t know that the necessary but 
not sufficient prior sign is a means to the end of not evading taxes. 
There is where the mixed nature of the response comes in. If the 
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agent in a buffer case knows4 that the necessary but not sufficient 
prior sign is a means to an end where he would be blameless, then 
we can affirm that the agent has the requisite control. This is one 
reason why it is crucial to recognise that the cognitive conditions on 
robustness belong in an account of ability and not on the epistemic 
condition on moral responsibility: the agent’s knowledge affects his 
control.
In other words, if Joe had the doxastic ability to claim the ille-
gal tax deduction, and he had the reliable doxastic ability to refrain 
from evading taxes (which he would have, if he knew that attending 
to moral reasons was the means to that end), then Joe would have 
the requisite control and the example would be no problem. Before 
moving on to the scenario where Joe doesn’t have that knowledge I 
want to offer a few comments regarding the case if we assume that 
Joe does have this knowledge. I have just stated that Joe would have 
the reliable doxastic ability to refrain from evading taxes. It might be 
objected that this is patently false: it’s inevitable that Joe evades taxes 
in the scenario, because if he attends to moral reasons, the neurosci-
entist will begin his intervention. It is at this point that the distinc-
tion introduced in section 3.2 becomes vital. It is actions that need to 
be avoidable, not non-actional, dated states of affairs. An agent will 
bear responsibility for a particular decision only if that particular 
decision is avoidable. And the decision to evade taxes for which Joe 
is responsible was avoidable. Moreover, on the current assumptions 
the alternative is robust: Joe knew just what he had to do to avoid 
making the decision that he in fact made.
Now, the Frankfurtian might object here, complaining that there 
is an inevitable state of affairs concerning Joe’s decision—that Joe 
decides to evade taxes—which shows that the decision wasn’t avoidable. 
Note that this is only the case if we allow that a person can be caused 
to decide, and, moreover, caused to decide in a particular way. Many lee-
way incompatibilists would reject (at least) the latter idea. But in any 
case, if we clearly distinguish between the performance of a particu-
lar decision and a state of affairs which affirms that a decision of that 
type has been made, the leeway incompatibilist could accept that a 
person can be caused to decide something and still hold on to PAP. 
4 Or is suitably “cognitively sensitive” to this fact.
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For if we allow that people can be caused to decide, then what the 
Frankfurtian needs to show is not just that Joe can be responsible 
when the state of affairs that Joe decides to evade taxes is inevitable, but 
that he can be responsible even when the state of affairs that Joe de-
cides on his own to evade taxes is inevitable. And that he has not shown.
Let us now return to the case where Joe doesn’t have these be-
liefs, and so doesn’t have the required doxastic abilities (see 3.2). My 
suggestion is that if Joe is responsible, then what we have is a case 
of derivative responsibility. Consider the situation: we are told that 
Joe is deliberating about whether to claim the illegal tax deduction. 
And we’re told that Joe’s moral character is such that he “invariably” 
follows his self-interested desire. Indeed, he doesn’t have the abil-
ity that the leeway incompatibilist thinks is required to decide not 
to evade taxes—Joe could only (unknowingly) gain that ability by 
doing something unrelated to it. But this means that the “decision” 
to evade taxes that it is stipulated he makes, if we can indeed call 
it a decision, is something which flows, pretty much automatically, 
from Joe’s character. Indeed, it is hard to see what kind of control 
Joe exercises over this “decision.” In what sense is he active? Maybe 
he’s able to affect just when he makes the decision: he might make the 
decision at t1, or perhaps at t2, or maybe he could postpone it until 
tomorrow. But sooner or later this “decision” is going to flow from 
his desires, and there is nothing he can do (in the sense relevant to 
free will and control) to stop it.
Now, the leeway incompatibilist can readily agree that a person 
might be responsible for behaviour which flows from his character 
in this way. But as highlighted by the scare quotes, he will probably 
hesitate to say that intentions acquired in this way are decisions, and 
he might even hesitate to call the resulting behaviour an action. Still, 
he can affirm that the person is responsible by appealing to derivative 
responsibility. And this provides a plausible way of handling Joe’s 
case. We might imagine, for example, that Joe was brought up by 
pious parents who inveighed against the greed inherent in much of 
modern society and who tried to bring Joe up to be a good citizen. 
Joe listened patiently enough but decided he was going to put the 
gratification of his desire for money ahead of all others. He vigor-
ously pursued this goal by deliberately choosing, on many different 
occasions, to shut out moral considerations. Indeed, Joe did this with 
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joy, knowing that he would soon develop the habit of pursing his own 
self-interests. Now, as Joe faces this decision about taxes, he will 
evade taxes pretty much “on autopilot,” as we might say. Neverthe-
less, he’s derivatively morally responsible for making the illegal tax 
deduction in virtue of those decisions which were made in order to 
form his character in a certain way. So the leeway incompatibilist can 
accept all the details of the case, if it is suitably filled out. Of course, 
if the case is filled out differently, such that it’s clear Joe isn’t respon-
sible for the character traits from which the decision flows, then the 
leeway incompatibilist can simply deny that Joe is responsible. Either 
way, we do not have a successful Frankfurt-style case.
Conclusion
In this essay I have investigated the interesting idea that some of 
the conditions typically treated as part of the “epistemic condition 
on moral responsibility” are better thought of as affecting what the 
agent controls. I have distinguished between notions of ability which 
include a doxastic component and those that do not, and have inves-
tigated how this distinction helps us to understand different levels 
of control that an agent might possess. I made what I took to be an 
important distinction between an agent’s control over her actions 
and her control over non-actional, dated states of affairs, highlight-
ing two different uses of the ‘up to us’ locution which reflect this 
distinction. And I then applied these insights to the indeterminis-
tic buffer Frankfurt-style cases, arguing that a mixed response to 
these cases, dependent on whether the agent has any doxastic abili-
ties, shows how these cases pose no problem for the defender of the 
Principle of Alternative Possibilities.5
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